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Abstract
Recent years have seen an upsurge of novel sources of
new venture financing through crowdfunding (CF).
We draw on 54,943 successfully crowdfunded projects
and 3,313 venture capital (VC) investments through-
out the period 04/2012-06/2015 to investigate, on
the aggregate level, how crowdfunding is related to
a more traditional source of entrepreneurial finance,
venture capital. Granger causality tests support
the view that VC investments follow crowdfunding
investments. Cointegration tests also suggest a
long-run relationship between crowdfunding and VC
investments, while impulse response functions (IRF)
indicate a positive effect running from CF to VC
within two to six months. Crowdfunding seems to
help VC investors in assessing future trends rather
than crowding them out of the market.
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1 Introduction
”[T]his year, we’ve been slower to invest partially be-
cause in our analysis, there are years where there are
lots of new ideas and big swings that are going for
new industries. I feel like last year and maybe the
year before were better years for big new ideas. This
year, we haven’t seen as many.”1
Aileen Lee, Cowboy Ventures
Entrepreneurship is “always a voyage of explo-
ration into the unknown, an attempt to discover new
ways of doing things better than they have been done
before” Hayek (1948, p. 101). The need for experi-
mentation is deeply rooted in entrepreneurship. An
environment which facilitates experimentation and
tolerates failures is the mainstay of a prospering eco-
nomic ecosystem that generates innovations (Kerr,
Nanda, and Rhodes-Kropf, 2014).
Within such an environment, many new business
ideas compete, but only a few single ventures will
actually survive and bring their products to market.
As future outcomes are distant und unpredictable,
entrepreneurs and their financiers are plagued with
uncertainty about whether or not a particular prod-
uct will sell or a business model will turn out to
be successful. Different types of financiers deal with
these uncertainties in different ways. In crowdfund-
ing, many small investors place bets on the potential
1http://techcrunch.com/2015/09/28/early-stage-
investors-apply-the-brakes; accessed June 1st, 2016.
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of a business idea. To receive venture capital (VC)
funding business ideas undergo a profound selection
process through a specialized investor. The aim of
this paper is to investigate how crowdfunding relates
to VC. More specifically, we seek to answer the ques-
tion whether crowdfunding and VC are rather com-
plements or substitutes.
Crowdfunding is a relatively new gateway for en-
trepreneurs to access capital for creative and novel
ideas (Belleflamme, Lambert, and Schwienbacher,
2014; Cumming and Johan, 2016; Mollick, 2014;
Schwienbacher and Larralde, 2012). It allows indi-
viduals and creative users to start experiments with
new products and services (Von Hippel, 1986) within
a wide range of capital supply. The amount can vary
from a few dollars for a pottery project to $20 mil-
lion for a new smart watch. Average individual con-
tributions are rather low2 and entrepreneurial ven-
tures typically use crowdfunding in the very early,
exploratory phase. The money is raised via online
platforms, such as Kickstarter, which provide en-
trepreneurs with a direct interaction with potential
end users. Through their feedback, end users provide
evaluations of the business idea and may prove use-
ful in reshaping and improving the product. The en-
trepreneurs not only attract potential customers and
early-stage financiers on the crowdfunding platform,
but also obtain higher visibility, for example through
press coverage. Crowdfunding may help to aggregate
market expectations about the likelihood of future
events, trends and technologies. Mollick and Kup-
puswamy (2014) suggest that crowdfunding appears
to support traditional entrepreneurship. In fact, if
the crowd provides expert-like assessment of future
technology trends, than a positive long-run relation-
ship between crowdfunding and VC investments may
exist, in which VC investments follow crowdfunding
investments at a time lag.
Crowdfunding processes may validate the feasibil-
ity and viability of new technologies. Crowdfunding
not only reflects an investment into future products,
i.e., needs that may not be satisfied in the current
2Mollick (2014) reports the average goal of $5,064 for all
2,317 funded projects on Kickstarter in the period from its in-
ception in 2009 to July, 2012; the average contribution amounts
to $20,563 in our sample.
market, but also provides VC investors with a crowd-
driven proof of concept for certain technologies and
markets. Just like bees may indicate the direction
to a distant flower patch yielding nectar and pollen
through a ‘waggle dance’ in their hive (Von Frisch,
1967), crowdfunding investors may fulfil a comple-
mentary role to VC investors, by providing them with
information towards new products and product cat-
egories. Crowdfunding platforms may thus support
products and ideas, which would otherwise not be
pursued. The “wisdom of the crowd” may not only
lead to more projects that search for VC financing,
but also improve the quality of projects that are in
the market. This is important as deal flow has been
shown as a large concern for VC investors (Hochberg,
Ljungqvist, and Lu, 2010), in particular in ho peri-
ods when “too much money chases too few deals”
(Gompers and Lerner, 2000). Alternatively, we con-
sider the opposite view, namely that crowdfunding
and VC investors compete for deals in some segments
of the market, where the availability of crowdfunding
increases the supply of funds that compete for a lim-
ited number of projects. If this is the case, crowd-
funding and VC investments will be substitutes and
crowdfunding would crowd out VC investments.
Our research questions ask whether there is a long-
run relationship between crowdfunding and VC in-
vestments on the aggregate and the industry levels,
and whether crowdfunding and VC investments are
linked, such that an increase in crowdfunding causes
an increase (or decrease) in VC investments. To
answer these questions, we use a dataset covering
54,943 crowdfunding investments that have success-
fully reached their funding goal and 3,313 VC in-
vestments in the US. Our analysis starts with the
adoption of JOBS Act in April 2012, which fueled
crowdfunding investments, and ends in June 2015.
We test whether one time series Granger causes the
other, and we employ a cointegration test to investi-
gate whether there is a long-run relationship between
crowdfunding and VC investments. The results sug-
gest that crowdfunding Granger causes VC invest-
ments. We also find a long-term relationship be-
tween crowdfunding and VC investments; the time se-
ries are cointegrated. Successful crowdfunding cam-
paigns lead to a subsequent increase in VC invest-
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ments. This holds in aggregate and especially for
hardware and consumer electronics.
We perform a separate analysis for ‘small’ VC in-
vestments below $500,000 (which are comparable to
crowdfunding investments in their size) to investi-
gate whether crowdfunding may potentially crowd
out VC investments within this segment. We do
not find evidence in support of a crowding-out ef-
fect. Our work helps to clarify the role that crowd-
funding plays in financing entrepreneurial ventures.
It contributes to several strands of the literature.
We add to the emerging literature on crowdfunding
(e.g. Agrawal, Catalini, and Goldfarb, 2015; Ahlers et
al., 2015; Lehner, Grabmann, and Ennsgraber, 2015;
Cumming and Johan, 2016; Mollick, 2013; Mollick
and Kuppuswamy, 2014; Mollick and Nanda, 2015).
To the best of our knowledge, no empirical analy-
sis exists that focuses on the possible connection be-
tween crowdfunding and VC investments, though re-
cent work addresses the link between business an-
gels and VC investors (Berkovitch, Grinstein, and Is-
rael, 2015; Chemmanur and Chen, 2014; Hellmann,
Schure, and Vo, 2015; Hellmann and Thiele, 2015).
Our study extends previous analyses that sug-
gest that crowdfunding is able to lead to and sup-
port traditional entrepreneurship(Mollick and Kup-
puswamy, 2014). The (visible and oftentimes large
scale) involvement of the online brand community
may present a strong signal of a project viability
and market validity, which, in turn, may influence
the perception of other investors that have not in-
vested yet. Our study seems to support the view
that crowds are not ‘mad’ but rather ‘wise’ (Mollick
and Nanda, 2015). As such, our work is linked to
theoretical work focusing on equilibrium models that
endogenize the size and structure of the seed/angel
stage market to conceptually model the size of the VC
market (e.g. Hellmann and Thiele, 2015). VC funded
startups might jump on a bandwagon of new trends
discovered on crowdfunding platforms and commer-
cialize these ideas with more financial resources that
enable to scale faster. Hence, the existence of crowd-
funding encourages entrepreneurs to engage in more
experimentation, which subsequently broadens the
market for VC investments.
It is not only the quantity, but the early test for
viability may also improve the quality of projects
that compete in the marketplace. Crowdfunded en-
trepreneurs might generate spillovers and spur the
birth and development of further companies in the
same and other technology fields as successful crowd-
funding campaigns can create interest in new projects
and co-creations.
2 Related Literature and Research
Question
2.1 Entrepreneurship as Experimentation
In March 2014, when Facebook bought Oculus Rift
– a company which raised money via Kickstarter –,
Marc Zuckerberg stated: “One day, we believe this
kind of immersive, augmented reality will become a
part of daily life for billions of people. Virtual reality
was once the dream of science fiction. But the inter-
net was also once a dream, and so were computers
and smartphones.”3
At the origin of such radically new products or ser-
vices, there are creative and innovative entrepreneurs,
who, instead of being guided by what is in the
present, arrange their affairs on the grounds of their
visions for the future. An entrepreneur imagines a
novel product or service that would excite customers
and generate large market demand. “What he ‘sees’
is that, by assembling available resources in an inno-
vative, hitherto undreamt of, fashion, and thus per-
haps converting them into new, hitherto undreamt of
products, he may be able (in the future) to sell out-
put at prices which exceed the cost of that output to
himself”(Kirzner, 2009, p. 150).
Yet, for novel firms and unproven technologies,
tremendous uncertainty exists about whether the rev-
enue model will work and whether the technology will
be feasible. The probability that such endeavors will
succeed is low, extremely skewed, and impossible to
predict (Kerr et al., 2014a). In a Canadian sample,
(A˚stebro, 2003) finds that only 7-9% of entrepreneurs
succeed in turning their inventions into marketable
3https://www.facebook.com/zuck/posts/
10101319050523971, accessed June 1st, 2016.
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products. Of those few that do, 60% earn negative
returns, while 8% reach returns higher than 1,400%.
Related to this, Cochrane (2005), investigating the
returns of VC investors, finds that they are, by and
large, driven by a handful of very successful invest-
ments.
Experimentation with various business ideas is
necessary to find these very successful investments
and to separate the good from the bad opportuni-
ties. Recent literature (Kerr, Nanda, and Rhodes-
Kropf, 2014; Manso, 2011; Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf,
2013) suggests that important factors (beyond finan-
cial capital) that drive entrepreneurial activity are a
mindset of experimentation and a willingness to fail.
To create radically novel products and services, en-
trepreneurs – who act in good faith on imagined new
venture ideas – must have the chance to experiment
with their ideas and not to be punished when they fail
(Manso, 2011). Recent work strongly points towards
the benefits of experimenting with diverse business
ideas, which results in more ideas coming to fruition,
and has a longer-lasting effect on subsequent novel
activity (Kornish and Ulrich, 2011; Østergaard, Tim-
mermans, and Kristinsson, 2011) and technological
progress (Kerr, Nanda, and Rhodes-Kropf, 2014).
2.2 Entrepreneurship as Experimentation
The availability of financial capital is recognized as
having a significant impact on whether entrepreneurs
are able to progress in the gestation stage of new
venture creation, or whether they have to aban-
don their business idea (Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and
Rosen, 1994; Reynolds, 2011; Van Gelderen, Thurik,
and Bosma, 2006). For VC investors, it is difficult
to assess which technology or venture will succeed
or which industry offers a high potential (Ewens and
Rhodes-Kropf, 2015). In fact, strong variations exist
in how skilled VCs are at assessing potential invest-
ments (Agrawal, Catalini, and Goldfarb, 2015)). In
consequence, substantial residual uncertainty about
venture viability exists. Kerr, Lerner, and Schoar
(2014) argue that the highly skewed returns of VC
investors are evidence in favor of high uncertainty
and large prediction errors, such that even the more
prominent VC investors cannot distinguish the next
Steve Jobs from the next Adam Osborne. Not sur-
prisingly then, Kerr, Lerner, and Schoar (2014) re-
port low correlations between VC investors’ assess-
ments and levels of future success. VC investors pass-
ing on what later turns out to be extremely success-
ful endeavors are not an exception. Kerr, Lerner, and
Schoar (2014) describe the hesitations of VC investors
to fund Airbnb because they could simply not un-
derstand (or imagine) that the business model could
actually work.
When VC investors select in which companies and
industries to invest, they consider different crite-
ria. Kaplan and Stro¨mberg (2004) distinguish be-
tween three categories: internal factors (such as man-
agement quality), external factors (such as market
size and customer adoption) and difficulty of exe-
cution and implementation. While internal factors
are subject to asymmetric information between the
entrepreneur and the VC investor, external factors
are subject to uncertainty, but information is not
necessarily asymmetrically distributed because en-
trepreneurs may face the uncertainty as well. VC
investors often reward stock options to founders that
secure threshold number of customers who have pur-
chased the product and reported positive feedback
(Kaplan and Stro¨mberg, 2004). This contingency
supports the view that external factors, such as the
expected market size and customer adoption, are im-
portant for VC investors. This is understandable,
because they directly affect project revenues.
2.3 Technology Assessment and Crowdfund-
ing
Crowdfunding offers multiple evaluations by thou-
sands of potential backers, who, as end users of
the product, might be well-positioned to judge the
project’s viability. Through their investments, in-
dividual backers express their interest in using the
product and their belief in its successful development.
Products are therefore not developed based on the
perceptions and wishes of imaginary customers. In-
stead, they are developed if and only if real customers
buy into their vision today. Prior research has found
4
that aggregated group decisions tend to be more ac-
curate than decisions by individuals in which only
a single decision maker relies on his sole assessment
(Budescu and Chen, 2014; Larrick, Mannes, and Soll,
2011). Not surprisingly, bandwagon effects have been
reported (Mollick, 2013), where additional investors
come on board when momentum is building up. A
wider range of expertise makes evaluation more ac-
curate, reduces information frictions, and, thus, pro-
vides greater efficiency in funding decisions. The
crowd has been reported to be surprisingly ratio-
nal in their decision making, despite the potential
for herding and madness (Mollick and Nanda, 2015).
Recent empirical evidence supports the view that the
crowd makes accurate, expert-like assessments (Mol-
lick and Nanda, 2015), and relies on signals (Ahlers et
al., 2015; Mollick, 2013). Mollick and Kuppuswamy
(2014) demonstrate a large success probability among
projects funded via Kickstarter. Over 90% of funded
projects remained ongoing ventures 1-4 years after
their campaign.
By offering a direct market test, crowdfunding
makes product demand more calculable. Not surpris-
ingly, crowdfunding has been influential in areas such
as gaming, internet-related technologies, wearable
computing, and three-dimensional printing (Mollick
and Nanda, 2015), which directly address end users.
The visible and large scale involvement of the on-
line brand community may present a strong signal
of a project’s viability and market validity, which in
turn may influence the perception of other investors
that have not invested yet (Agrawal, Catalini, and
Goldfarb, 2015; Lehner, Grabmann, and Ennsgraber,
2015; Cumming and Johan, 2016). Also, successful
entrepreneurs generate spillovers and spur the evolu-
tion of new technology fields, and this initiates the
emergence and growth of further companies.
2.4 Crowdfunding and Venture Capital Fi-
nancing
While information generation for the individual in-
vestor is expensive and cumbersome to obtain, ob-
serving several experiments and their reception by
the market may be valuable and may help to up-
date prior beliefs. While VC investors may be un-
certain about the diffusion of new technologies, they
may observe crowdfunding behavior and process in-
formation to make more informed investment choices.
Successful experiments shift the probability predic-
tions of uncertain technologies and may make a con-
tinuation or funding decision more likely. When VC
investors observe that a certain new technology re-
ceived widespread community support, they may in-
terpret it as an indicator of the true venture viability
and technological feasibility in this field. According
to (p. 131 Zider, 1998), “One myth is that venture
capitalists invest in good people and good ideas. The
reality is that they invest in good industries.” Crowd-
funding campaigns can create interest in new projects
and co-creations. Take for example the market for
smart locks. While Lockitron raised some $2 mil-
lion directly from their customers, the Yves Behar
start-up August raised the same amount from Cow-
boy Ventures (and syndicate partners) and entered
the market a few months later. Both companies rep-
resent bets on a potential standard that might emerge
and whether or not consumers will gravitate to one or
another of the very different designs of the products.
The VC investors placed their bet after witnessing
the early success of the first mover, and scaled their
venture faster.4
Above and beyond the crowd’s assessment of
emerging technologies and trends crowdfunding may
also increase the number of entrepreneurial projects
that will be pursued and thus increase the deal flow
for VC investors. Consequently, crowdfunding may
encourage entrepreneurs to pursue their experiments
and simultaneously provide information on future
markets trends (and potential market sizes).
Alternatively, crowdfunding could also compete
with VC investors for funding and in supporting
promising business ideas. As backers of projects
know their needs and may also possess knowledgeable
skills in the technical domain in which the project op-
erates, they may be able to assist the entrepreneur
in product development by creating an ecosystem
that facilitates access to resources between various
4http://www.hackthings.com/who-will-win-the-smart-
lock-race-august-or-lockitron/, accessed June 1st, 2016.
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stakeholders (Belleflamme, Lambert, and Schwien-
bacher, 2014; Frydrych et al., 2014). Crowdfunding
may therefore provide a viable instrument to finance
entrepreneurial experiments. In comparison with
‘real-life’ experimentation, in which the costs of fail-
ure and stigma might be high (Landier, 2005), the
crowd may provide a low-cost alternative for experi-
mentation (Mollick, 2014). Similarly, the crowd pro-
vides financial capital up-front and not conditional on
reaching various milestones as it is common in other
types of entrepreneurial financing (Tian, 2011; Tian
and Wang, 2014). In fact, instead of relying on VC in-
vestors to provide value-adding advice, entrepreneurs
might simply substitute formal capital with informal
capital through the crowd. This might be relevant
especially for smaller and earlier investments.
3 Data
We draw our sample from the crowdfunding platform
Kickstarter and from the VC database CrunchBase.
As we explain below, we believe that these two data
sources are representative of crowdfunding and VC
investment activity in US-based companies within
the selected time window. We describe the VC seg-
ments, subsegments and categories in Table 1.
Kickstarter is a global crowdfunding platform,
which has the mission to “help bring creative projects
to life”.5 Kickstarter serves as an intermediary be-
tween potential funders and creators of projects, and
does not claim any ownership over the projects. In-
dividual funders (who are called backers) can con-
tribute small amounts of money starting from a few
dollars. For their contributions they are offered re-
wards, which vary depending on the amount the
backer contributes; they can include things like cards,
t-shirts, cups, or the possibility to spend a day with
the project creator or to be one of the first that
obtain the new product. Kickstarter operates on
an All-or-Nothing basis, meaning that only when
funding goals are reached the project creator will
receive the pledged funds (Cumming, Leboeuf, and
Schwienbacher, 2014). In addition, potential and ac-
5https://www.kickstarter.com/charter/, accessed June 1st,
2016.
tual project backers may participate in online discus-
sions and exchange their opinions about the project
with the creator and among each other. Creators
of projects apply for funding in fifteen different ar-
eas ranging from culture to technology. When they
post a project, they choose a deadline and a min-
imum funding goal. If the goal is not reached by
the deadline, the project ends without any funds col-
lected. We gather information on all projects based
in the US that successfully reached their funding goal
within the period from 04/2012 to 06/2015 on the
Kickstarter platform. This was possible as the web-
pages of all projects are archived and accessible to the
public. Our crowdfunding segment comprises 54,943
projects and a total funding volume of $1.13 billion
(see Table 2) pledged by a total of 14,450,179 back-
ers. A median project raised $5,206. The average
pledge amount of $20,563 is attributable to several
major projects that raised more than $50,000.
We employ Kickstarter for three main reasons.
Firstly, Kickstarter is the world’s largest online
crowdfunding platform, having raised more than $2
billion from its inception on April 28, 2009 to October
31, 2015. Secondly, Kickstarter has been described as
being representative of projects seeking funding from
the crowd (Mollick and Nanda, 2015; Mollick, 2014).
Thirdly, Kickstarter campaigns are associated with a
strong backer network and active online communica-
tion between (potential) end users.
We perform analyses on the aggregate level (our
aggregate crowdfunding measure is based on all 15
categories available on Kickstarter) and, in addition,
we focus separately on the following investment cate-
gories: hardware and consumer electronics (which we
label hardware), media, arts and entertainment (me-
dia), and fashion, wellness and personal care (fash-
ion).6 We are able to assign 94.3% of all projects to
one of these three categories.7
6Mollick (2014) defines seven basic themes based on the 15
Kickstarter categories: namely (i) art and craft, (ii) design,
(iii) music, dance and theater, (iv) fashion, (v) film, video,
and games, (vi) publishing, photography, comics, and journal-
ism, and (vii) technology as the main categories. He does not
mention the category of food.
7The only Kickstarter category that we do not assign to
one of the investment categories is food because it does not
fit to any of our three investment categories. We also cannot
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Table 1: Investment segments, subsegments and categories.
Variable Description
Investment Segments
cf sum Volume ($) of Kickstarter crowdfunding investments.
vc sum Volume ($) of CrunchBase venture capital investments (angel, seed, venture).
vc angel seed Volume ($) of venture capital investments attributable to angel investor
and seed stage financing, denoted as “Angel” and “Seed” at CrunchBase.
vc early growth Volume ($) of venture capital investments attributable to venture
(early stage and growth) financing, denoted as “Venture” at CrunchBase.
Investment Categories
cf hardware, vc hardware Volume ($) of investments in the category hardware and consumer
electronics (hardware).
cf media, vc media Volume ($) of investments in the category media, arts, entertainment (media).
cf fashion, vc fashion Volume ($) of investments in the category fashion, wellness, personal care
(fashion).
Our second data source, CrunchBase, is a database
which comprises data on VC investments, VC-backed
companies, and VC investors in the US (Cumming,
Walz, and Werth, 2016). Every registered member
can make submissions to the database; however, all
changes are subject to review by a moderator before
being accepted. Analogously to the crowdfunding
sample, we extract data for investments in US-based
companies during the period spanning from 04/2012
to 06/2015. The VC segment consists of 3,313 VC
investments totaling $19.1 billion (see Table 2). We
retrieved the sample on August 17, 2015 for Crunch-
Base subsegments ‘angel’, ‘seed’, and ‘venture’. Due
to the very low number of observations in the an-
gel subsegment, we merged the observations from the
first two subsegments into one: angel seed. We label
the second subsegment early growth, as it includes
both these stages of VC financing. We trimmed the
sample to comprise only the 99% percentile to avoid
size distortions by extreme outliers. We are confi-
dent that CrunchBase is representative of the VC in-
vestment activity in US-based companies. Block and
Sandner (2009), who focus on Internet start-ups be-
tween 2007 and 2009, report that CrunchBase quar-
include it as a separate category because the time series yields
several zero entries, which would make the empirical analysis
too fragile.
terly time series correlate highly with the National
Venture Capital Association (NVCA) quarterly time
series (Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.67) and
cover almost 97% of the volume reported by the
NVCA.8
Within the CrunchBase we find a vast number of
investments that do not correspond to similar cate-
gories in Kickstarter. We eliminate categories such as
biotechnology, software, e-commerce and enterprise
software development, clean technology and manu-
facturing, health care and life science, advertising,
and semiconductors from the CrunchBase sample.
The remaining categories represent a map with the
three investment categories we defined for Kickstarter
projects.
To assess the coverage within investment cate-
gories, we make a comparison between CrunchBase
and other data sources. In the media category,
for example, the volume of investments reported in
CrunchBase amounts to $10.8 billion (see Table 2),
while the volume of investments reported by NVCA
during 2012-2014 in the category media and enter-
tainment amounts to $11.0 billion (NVCA, 2015).
Compared to other databases commonly used in
8We cannot use data from the NVCA for our purposes,
because they do not provide monthly time series for investment
categories.
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VC research, such as Thomson or Venture Source,
CrunchBase seems to have a better coverage of
smaller investments. For example, within our sam-
ple period we find 670 investments in the hardware
category in CrunchBase, with a median of $1.7 mil-
lion and a 25 percentile of $0.3 million. In Venture
Source, we find only 310 investments in the category
electronics and hardware, with a median of $4.5 mil-
lion and a 25 percentile of $1.3 million. In the media
category, our sample has a median of $1.5 million
and a 25 percentile of $0.3 million, while the mean
and 25 percentile investments in the categories (i)
media and content and (ii) entertainment reported
in Venture Source reach $3.0 million and $1.1 mil-
lion respectively. We therefore believe CrunchBase to
be representative of the VC investment universe and
to have a wider coverage than competing databases.
Similarly, Alexy et al. (2012) attest to the wide spec-
trum covered in CrunchBase, ranging from very small
to very large companies, such as Google and Face-
book.
Our analysis considers crowdfunding and VC in-
vestments in a timeframe starting with the JOBS Act
enactment9 in April 2012. Until the passage of the
JOBS Act, the use of internet funding portals in pri-
vate placements was extremely limited by law. The
JOBS Act introduced several important changes in
laws and regulations and crowdfunding volumes made
a jump after the JOBS Act was enacted. According
to our data, it was only in 2012 that the volume of
investments through Kickstarter first exceeded $10
million.
4 Methodology
We perform our analysis in four steps. We be-
gin with correlations between crowdfunding and
VC investment time series (for investment seg-
ments, subsegments, and categories). Second, we
test for the order of integration of all our time
series, which, subsequently, affects our choice of
methods. We employ the augmented Dickey–Fuller
9The JOBS Act was signed by Barack Obama on April 5,
2012, and became public law immediately. http://thomas.loc.
gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:HR03606:@@@X, accessed June
1st, 2016.
(ADF), Phillips–Perron (PP) and non-parametric
Kwiatkowski–Phillips–Schmidt–Shin (KPSS) tests
(Dickey and Fuller, 1979; Dickey and Fuller, 1981;
Kwiatkowski et al., 1992; Phillips and Perron, 1988).
Several authors argue that joint testing of both nulls
can strengthen inferences made about the station-
arity or non-stationarity of time series (e.g. Maddala
and Kim, 1998).10 Third, we focus on Granger causal-
ity between crowdfunding and VC investments. In
fact, robust inferences following Granger (1969) are
only possible with stationary time series. Granger
and Newbold (1974) as well as Phillips (1986) point
out that Granger causality tests of non-stationary or
mixed-stationary time series might suggest a statisti-
cally significant relationship where there is none: i.e.,
a ‘spurious regression’. As some of our time series
are not stationary, we resort to the robust procedure
for integrated or cointegrated time-series proposed by
Toda and Yamamoto (1995), which we describe be-
low. We complement these findings using a visual-
ization through impulse response functions. Impulse
response functions trace the response of current and
future values of one endogenous variable to a one-unit
increase of the exogenous variable (Cholesky decom-
position).
Fourth, in order to detect common stochastic
trends among the analyzed time series pairs, we
perform the Johansen cointegration test (Johansen,
1988; Johansen and Juselius, 1990). We test for the
order of cointegration among our tested pairs of time
series for investment segments, subsegments, and cat-
egories. The Johansen cointegration test makes the
assumption that two I(1) time series are cointegrated
when their linear combination becomes an I(0) pro-
cess (Engle and Granger, 1987). If two time series
share a common trend, there will be Granger causal-
ity in one or more directions between them (Cuth-
bertson, Hall, and Taylor, 1992). Unlike Granger
causality test, cointegration tests cannot establish
the direction of causality, but identify cointegrating
10The ADF and PP unit root tests test the null hypothesis
that a time series Yt is I(1), while the KPPS stationarity test
is a complementary test for the null hypothesis that Yt is I(0).
ADF and PP tests can fail to reject the null hypothesis of a
unit root for many economic time series (e.g., Davidson and
MacKinnon (2004)).
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics at project level.
Variable Count Volume($) Mean($) Std. dev. ($) 25% ($) 50% ($) 75% ($)
Investment Segment
cf sum 54,943 1,129,797,195 20,563 157,455 2,120 5,206 12,750
vc sum 3,313 19,080,899,413 5,759,402 10,485,333 300,000 1,550,000 6,000,000
vc angel seed 1,735 1,482,544,313 854,492 1,043,659 100,000 500,000 1,300,000
vc early growth 1,578 17,598,355,100 11,152,316 13,195,885 3,000,000 6,450,000 14,000,000
Investment Category
cf hardware 5,635 381,439,823 67,691 394,824 3,865 14,374 47,942
vc hardware 670 4,041,163,781 6,031,588 10,258,284 300,000 1,737,500 6,500,000
cf media 44,125 653,974,351 14,821 101,534 2,025 4,710 10,460
vc media 1,960 10,762,930,264 5,491,291 10,218,517 323,750 1,500,000 5,500,000
cf fashion 2,062 41,994,805 20,366 53,100 2,494 6,679 19,060
vc fashion 503 3,646,393,650 7,249,292 12,285,636 500,000 2,000,000 9,000,000
VARs, i.e., long-run equilibrium relationships.
4.1 Granger Causality
Wiener (1956, p. 127) introduced the notion that “for
two simultaneously measured signals, if we can pre-
dict the first signal better by using the past infor-
mation from the second one than by using the in-
formation without it, then we call the second signal
causal to the first one”. Granger (1969) followed this
idea of causality in the context of linear autoregres-
sive models of stochastic processes. A bivariate linear
autoregressive model of two stationary time series Xt
and Yt with zero means can be written as following
vector autoregressions (Granger, 1969):
Xt = a1 +
m∑
j=1
βjXt−j +
m∑
j=1
γjYt−j + 1t (1)
Yt = a2 +
m∑
j=1
δjXt−j +
m∑
j=1
ϕjYt−j + 2t (2)
where m is the maximum number of lagged obser-
vations included (the model order), matrices β, γ, δ ϕ
contain the coefficients of the model (contributions
of each lagged observation to the predicted values of
Xt and Yt), and 1t and 2t are uncorrelated white-
noise series with mean-zero sequence. If the variance
of 1t (or 2t) is reduced by the inclusion of lags of
Yt (or Xt), then Yt (or Xt) Granger causes Xt (or
Yt).
11 This implies that Yt is causing Xt, provided
the coefficients in γj are not zero. The interdepen-
dence can be tested by performing an F -test of the
null hypothesis that γj = 0, given assumptions of co-
variance stationarity on Xt and Yt (Geweke, 1982).
Similarly Xt is causing Yt, if the coefficients in δj are
6= 0. If both of these events occur, there is said to be
a ‘feedback’ between Xt and Yt.
Yet Granger causality is highly dependent on the
order of integration and the estimation of the VAR
when its variables are integrated. Granger (1969) as-
sumes that only stationary time series are involved.
11Granger (1969) formalizes his theory of causality under
the condition of two main axioms: (1) Causes precede their
effects in time and (2) a time series Xt causes a time series
Yt, if the prediction of the future of the time series Yt can be
improved using the combined past values of Xt and Yt rather
than using information from the past of Yt alone. Formally, Yt
is (Granger) causing Xt (Y ⇒ X), when σ2(X | U) > σ2(X |
U − Y ) where σ2(X | U) is the prediction error in the case
where all information from the past is used and σ2(X | U − Y )
is the prediction error corresponding to the situation when Yt
was excluded from the information set.
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As our results indicate ambiguity as to the order of in-
tegration and cointegration properties, we follow the
procedures suggested in Toda and Yamamoto (1995).
4.2 Toda- and Yamamoto-based Granger
causality
Toda and Yamamoto (1995) propose a simple but ro-
bust procedure irrespective of the system’s integra-
tion or cointegration properties. This procedure re-
quires the estimation of an augmented VAR which
guarantees the asymptotic distribution of the Wald
statistic (an asymptotic χ2-distribution), since the
testing procedure is robust to the integration and
cointegration properties of the process (Dolado and
Lu¨tkepohl, 1996). The Toda and Yamamoto (1995)
test is a modified Wald (MWald) test for linear
restrictions on some parameters of an augmented
VAR(m + dmax) in levels, where m is the selected
lag order and dmax is the highest order of integration
suspected in the system (in our case at most 1). A
bivariate vector autoregressive model without deter-
ministic terms can be formalized as
Xt = a1 +
m∑
j=1
βjXt−j +
m+dmax∑
j=m+1
βjXt−j
+
m∑
j=1
γjYt−j +
m+dmax∑
j=m+1
γjYt−j + 1t (3)
Yt = a2 +
m∑
j=1
δjYt−j +
m+dmax∑
j=m+1
δjYt−j
+
m∑
j=1
ϕjXt−j +
m+dmax∑
j=m+1
ϕjXt−j + 2t (4)
where β, γ, δ ϕ are the parameters of the model,
1t and 2t are error terms and assumed to be white
noise with zero mean, constant variance and no auto-
correlation. In the first equation, the null hypothesis
of non-causality from Yt to Xt can be expressed as
H0 = γj = 0,∀i = 1, 2, ..m. Thus, causality implies
γj 6= 0.
To conduct the Toda and Yamamoto Granger
causality test, we employ three sequential procedures:
1. We determine the maximum order of integration
dmax for each pair of our variables. For all VAR
models, we conclude that dmax = 1.
2. We ensure the fit of our model through an ap-
propriate lag length selection m , allowing for
a drift and trend in each series. We determine
the optimal lag order to ascertain that the VAR
is well-specified by, first, minimizing one of the
common information criteria Akaike information
criterion (AIC), Bayesian information criterion
(BIC) or Schwartz information criterion (SIC)
and Final Prediction Error (FPE), and, second,
taking care of the remaining serial correlation in
the residuals through a Ljung and Box (1978)
portmanteau test (asymptotic). Subsequently,
we check on the inverse roots of AR characteris-
tics of polynomials for dynamic stability.
3. To test for the robustness of our estimator (mea-
surement with the optimum lag length (m) we
test with m+ 1 and m−1 to check if the causal-
ity among different lags is volatile or whether it
follows a smooth transition.
5 Results
5.1 Time Series Correlation
Figure 1 shows the development of our time series.
The upper left graph depicts the development of the
monthly volume of aggregate VC investments and
crowdfunding during the sample period. The two
time series are positively correlated (Pearson ρ =
0.431 and the correlation is highly statistically sig-
nificant p = 0.006. The remaining graphs show
monthly volumes of VC investments and crowdfund-
ing in our three investment categories. The upper
right graph visualizes the monthly volumes in the
hardware category for 670 VC investments that sum
to $4.0 billion and for 5,635 successful Kickstarter
campaigns that raised $381.4 million (see Table 1).
The correlation between the two time series is again
positive and highly statistically significant (ρ=0.553,
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Figure 1: Time series of monthly volumes of crowdfunding and venture capital investments.
p=0.001). The lower left graph depicts monthly in-
vestment volumes in the largest investment category,
media. There are in sum 1,960 VC investments total-
ing $10.8 billion, while 44,125 Kickstarter campaigns
raised $654.0 million. The times series are not cor-
related. Lastly, the lower right graph depicts the
time series for fashion. Over the course of the anal-
ysis horizon, we count 503 VC investments totaling
$3.6 billion, while at the same time, 2,062 Kickstarter
campaigns raised a total of $42.0 million. The cor-
relation between the two time series is positive and
statistically significant (ρ=0.357, p=0.019).
5.2 Order of Integration
Considering a 5% significance level, we find all time
series in the aggregate and within the categories to
be integrated of first order (as evidenced by the ADF
test). The PP and KPSS tests indicate that some
time series (cf sum, cf hardware, cf media, vc media
and vc fashion) may be integrated I(0) when tak-
ing a drift and a trend process into account. The
time series vc sum, vc hardware and cf fashion are
the only time series that are conclusively first dif-
ference stationary I(1). Taken together, our results
(not depicted, but available upon request) lack con-
vincing evidence to decisively reject the possibility of
no unit root, neither for crowdfunding nor for VC.
Our time series are either weakly stationary at level
or integrated at first order I(1).
5.3 Granger Causality (Toda and Ya-
mamoto, 1995)
In Table 3 we report the χ2-test statistics and
p-values obtained from the Toda-Yamamoto-based
Granger causality MWald tests (against the null hy-
pothesis of no Granger causality). The results indi-
cate that there is a strong Granger causality running
from cf sum to vc sum (χ2=13.1, p=0.023). This
11
Table 3: Toda and Yamamoto (1995) modified Wald (MWald) test for Granger causality.
Pair Lag χ2 p-value Granger causality
Investment Segments
cf sum→vc sum 5 13.1 0.023∗∗ Unidirectional causality
vc sum→cf sum 5 1.6 0.910 cf sum→vc sum
cf sum→vc angel seed 4 15.0 0.005 ∗∗∗ Unidirectional causality
vc angel seed→cf sum 4 4.7 0.320 cf sum→vc angel seed
cf sum→vc early growth 5 13.4 0.020 ∗∗ Unidirectional causality
vc early growth→cf sum 5 1.4 0.920 cf sum→vc early growth
Investment Categories
cf hardware→vc hardware 4 11.2 0.025∗∗ Unidirectional causality
vc hardware→cf hardware 4 1.7 0.780 cf hardware→vc hardware
cf media→vc media 5 4.9 0.420 No causality
vc media→cf media 5 2.5 0.770
cf fashion→vc fashion 5 2.5 0.770 No causality
vc fashion→cf fashion 5 5.4 0.360
∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1 significance level. χ2 and p-value are MWald test results. Tested with
constant and trend at maxlag = 6. Optimal lags are based on VAR estimations (AIC, BIC/SIC, FPE), Ljung and
Box (1978) portmanteau test (asymptotic) and inverse roots of AR characteristics of polynomials for dynamic stability.
causality is unidirectional, as we cannot reject the
hypothesis of non-causality from vc sum to cf sum
(χ2=1.6, p=0.910).12 We also find a strong uni-
directional causality in both VC subsegments, i.e.
from cf sum to vc angel seed (χ2=15.0, p=0.005) and
from cf sum to vc early growth (χ2=13.4, p=0.020).
We find a similar result for the investment category
hardware as the null hypothesis of non-causality run-
ning from cf hardware to vc hardware is also rejected
(χ2=11.2, p= 0.025), but the non-causality in the
other direction cannot be rejected. Our findings in-
dicate no causality for the media and fashion invest-
ment categories. Altogether, the total of crowdfund-
ing investments and in particular crowdfunding in the
12Additional analyses show that the p-values seem to be a
little lower around the optimal lag order of 5. For example,
from cf sum to vc sum, we obtain for lag 4: p=0.11, for lag
5: p=0.02, and for lag 6: p=0.13, while vc sum significantly
rejects the null hypothesis. This is indicative of a rather robust
model, whereas a less robust model would be expected to show
less symmetric fluctuations of p-values for m− 1 and m+ 1.
hardware category, Granger causes respective VC in-
vestments.
In order to investigate the dynamic effects of
changes in crowdfunding on VC investments, we fur-
ther apply an impulse response analysis (IRF). In
Figure 2, we consider the effects of a 1% shock of
cf sum (positive deviation from the steady state) on
vc sum, and in Figure 3 we look at the effects of a 1%
shock of cf hardware on vc hardware. For each fig-
ure, the black line indicates the point estimate and
red dashed lines indicate the two-sided 90% confi-
dence interval. A 1% increase in total crowdfunding
investments effects a cumulative 4% increase in total
VC investments at lag (month) 4 and a cumulative
10% increase at lag 6, respectively. There is a positive
effect on vc sum from lag 2 until lag 7 (with a total
increase of 14 basis points). Similarly, vc hardware
responds positively to a 1% increase in cf hardware.
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Figure 2: Cumulative impulse response functions of
vc sum to a 1% log-increase in cf sum. Dashed lines
indicate the 90% bootstrapped confidence interval.
Cholesky decomposition for a 2-variable VAR with
optimal number of lags chosen with FPE.
Here, we observe a persistent positive effect on
vc hardware until lag 6 and a total cumulative in-
crease of 40 basis points. Overall, the impulse re-
sponse analysis shows a positive effect of crowdfund-
ing investments on VC investments at a lag between 4
and 6. This result resonates well with the outcomes
from the Toda-Yamamoto-Granger causality analy-
ses.
5.4 Cointegration
Under the assumption that our time series are I(1)
and integrated of the same order, the bivariate Jo-
hansen cointegration trace and max eigenvalue test
indicate (at a 1% and 5% level) that there are cointe-
gration relationships among our analyzed time series
pairs (Table 4). For cf sum and vc sum, we can reject
the null hypothesis that there is no cointegration vec-
tor (r=0) among the two time series. Similarly, we
find at least one cointegration vector for cf hardware
and vc hardware. For the media and fashion invest-
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Figure 3: Cumulative impulse response functions
of vc hardware to a 1% log-increase in cf hardware.
Dashed lines indicate the 90% bootstrapped con-
fidence interval. Cholesky decomposition for a 2-
variable VAR with optimal number of lags chosen
with FPE.
ment categories, we find no cointegration vectors.13
In sum, the cointegration results support the ro-
bustness of the found causality. The Granger causal-
ity finds causality where the cointegration test finds
cointegration. As we can also reject the null of non-
causality in a cointegrated model, we are confident
about both results.
5.5 Crowding Out
We have extensively elaborated on the positive link
between crowdfunding and VC investments. Yet, en-
trepreneurs could also simply substitute formal cap-
13These results were confirmed using the bounds testing ap-
proach developed by Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (2001), which
is based on the OLS (ordinary least squares) estimation of an
ARDL (Autoregressive Distributed Lag) equation. The model
in the sense of Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (2001) is not only
capable to work with both I(0) and I(1) variables (as found
in the PP and KPSS test) but also more stable towards small
sample sizes (Pesaran, Shin, and Smith, 2001).
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Table 4: Bivariate Johansen cointegration test.
Pair Lag CIV Eigenvalue Trace Max eigenval. Conclusion
Investment Segments
cf sum, vc sum 5 r=0 0.481 36.131∗∗∗ 22.284∗∗ At least one coint. vector.
r≤1 0.335 13.846 ∗∗ 13.846 ∗∗
cf sum, vc angel seed 4 r=0 0.554 32.815 ∗∗∗ 28.259 ∗∗∗ One coint. vector.
r≤1 0.122 4.556 4.556
cf sum, vc early growth 5 r=0 0.480 36.699 ∗∗∗ 22.207 ∗∗ At least one coint. vector.
r≤1 0.347 14.492 ∗∗ 14.492 ∗∗
Investment Categories
cf hardware, vc hardware 4 r=0 0.411 31.336 ∗∗∗ 18.537 ∗ At least one coint. vector.
r≤1 0.306 12.799 ∗∗ 12.799 ∗∗
cf media, vc media 5 r=0 0.373 23.453 ∗ 15.885 No coint. vector.
r≤1 0.200 7.569 7.569
cf fashion, vc fashion 5 r=0 0.181 13.422 6.802 No coint. vector.
r≤1 0.177 6.620 6.620
∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1 significance level. χ2 and p-value are MWald test results. Tested with con-
stant and trend at maxlag = 6. The respective null hypothesis is denoted as r = 0 (“None”) and r ≤ 1 (“At least
one”) cointegration vector(s). The respective null hypothesis is denoted by r = 0 and r ≤ 1, where r = 0 de-
notes at least one cointegration vector. Optimal lags are based on VAR estimations (AIC, BIC/SIC, FPE), Ljung and
Box (1978) portmanteau test (asymptotic) and inverse roots of AR characteristics of polynomials for dynamic stabil-
ity. Trace and Max eigenvalue are the Johansen test statistics. Critical values from Osterwald-Lenum (1992). Critical
values for r = 0 at 5% are 25.32 (Trace) and 18.96 (Max eigenvalue) and 12.25 (Trace, Max eigenvalue) for r = 1.
ital with informal capital through the crowd. This
should be relevant especially for smaller and earlier
investments.
In the main analysis, we separate the investments
following the CrunchBase definition of angel and seed
investments (which we subsequently combine into one
subsegment which is sought to include the smaller
and earlier investments) and early stage and growth
stage investments. Granger causality test revealed
a unidirectional causality from crowdfunding to VC
investments for angel and seed investments.
We additionally investigate whether crowding-out
effect exists when projects involve smaller amounts of
financing using an alternative segmentation based on
investment volume. To this aim, we focus on ‘small’
VC investments below $500,000. When investigating
the relation between (all) crowdfunding investments
and ‘small’ VC investments, we again do not find any
evidence that crowdfunding would crowd out VC in-
vestments. We do not detect any significant correla-
tion between the time series. More interestingly, we
again document Granger causality from crowdfund-
ing to ‘small’ VC investments (χ2=11.8, p=0.038).
6 Discussion
Our understanding of individual factors enabling and
hindering entrepreneurship is steadily increasing. In
their interviews, Blanchflower and Oswald (1998)
provide evidence that inadequate financing is often
cited as one of the primary reasons for not becom-
ing self-employed. Over the past years, crowdfunding
platforms, such as Kickstarter, have offered financ-
ing to several groundbreaking technologies. Pebble,
Oculus VR, and Trace have not only garnered media
attention, but also attracted seven-digit funding. As
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Boudreau and Lakhani (2013) note, “crowds expand
the capabilities of companies; they should be viewed
as another tool for organizational problem solving.”
Ultimately, successful crowdfunding implies market
creation for products whose needs have not been sat-
isfied yet. Essentially, crowdfunding pledges reflect
the “wisdom of the crowd” in “screening new ven-
ture offerings and voting with their individual invest-
ment pledges for the best ones” (Bruton et al., 2015).
As such, the crowd can also enable VC investors to
”nowcast” (Choi and Varian, 2012) new products and
markets regarding their proof of concept and poten-
tial. Thus, crowdfunding is not only about collecting
money from the crowd, but also about crowdsourcing
information on needs and demands in the market, as
well as, in consequence, new market creation (Kim
and Mauborgne, 2014).
Our results suggest that the crowdfunding vol-
ume and the VC investment volume and are strongly
correlated, and we document a strong cointegration
between the two time series. Moreover, we con-
clude that an increase in crowdfunding investments
Granger causes subsequent VC investments. We cor-
roborate our findings using two VC subsegments: the
seed/angel and early/growth stage investments. Here
we find a similar and robust pattern: crowdfunding
Granger causes VC investments in both segments.
Our findings are consistent with the view that suc-
cessful crowdfunding campaigns help new technolo-
gies get attention from other investors. The visible
and often large-scale involvement of the online brand
community may present a strong signal of a technol-
ogy viability and market validity, which, in turn, may
influence the perception of other investors that have
not invested yet. Our study supports the view that
crowd is not ‘mad’ but ‘wise’ (Mollick and Nanda,
2015)).
This process may validate the authenticity of a firm
and its technology, and may reduce uncertainty as to
the feasibility and viability of new technologies on
the part of external (later stage) financiers, such as
VC investors. Our findings are also in line with the
picture of crowdfunding as a faster and more flexible
investment vehicle than VC investments. The ex-
ploratory phase may be too risky for these investors
and previous works suggest that entrepreneurs usu-
ally rely on other sources of capital (e.g. Robb and
Robinson, 2014). Crowdfunding may rapidly adapt to
changing economic conditions and to common wide
shocks because the fundraising and the decision pro-
cesses are less complex compared to VC funding (Ka-
plan and Stro¨mberg, 2004; Mollick, 2013). The Kick-
starter platform has the appealing feature that it
combines several sectors (which we summarized into
three main investment categories) that are character-
ized by varying degrees of tangibility and may differ
in the longevity of trends involved. Here, interest-
ingly, our results suggest that the Granger causality
and cointegration are only present in the hardware
category. VC investors tend to invest in the hard-
ware category when it received crowdfunding previ-
ously. In areas, such as gaming, internet-related tech-
nologies, wearable computing, and three-dimensional
printing the crowd appears to be a more reliable pre-
dictor (Mollick and Nanda, 2015). Here, VC investors
can move from screening to impacting the organi-
zational development, the hiring of key personnel,
and the crafting of human resource policies (Hell-
mann and Puri, 2002). In industries were market po-
tentials are higher and processes scalable, VCs may
have more margin to maneuver, which is important
given the reported inadequacy of commercialization
and team building approaches in crowdfunding (Mol-
lick and Kuppuswamy, 2014).
In the media category, we find a significant correla-
tion, but we do not find evidence for Granger causal-
ity and cointegration. We do not find any statisti-
cally significant relationship in the fashion category.
While the crowd might provide an accurate assess-
ment of trends in industries that involve hardware
and technology, it seems to be less likely to provide
long-lasting information on industries prone to short-
lived trends and fads, such as fashion and media. In-
vestment in these segments may less scalable than
hardware and technology investments. As such, there
might be limited ways in which the VC investors can
help in professionalizing the firm. We also test for an
alternative explanation reasoning that if the crowd
democratizes access to capital it may adversely af-
fect the investment opportunities for VC investors
form smaller and earlier investments, but we do not
find any evidence that would support the crowding-
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out argument. In sum, there is no downturn in VC
investments when crowd contributions rise. Rather,
the crowd and the VC investors seen to be synergistic
and complementary members of the same ecosystem.
7 Conclusion
Although crowdfunding may be an important predic-
tor of VC investment activity, we know surprisingly
little about how the opportunity for entrepreneurial
experimentation through crowdfunding affects the
demand for VC investments, and the amount that
VC investors eventually provide. If the quality
and number of entrepreneurs vary across time,
then so does the opportunity for VC investors to
fund investments. We draw a picture of a nuanced
financing eco-system in which entrepreneurial cycles
and investment cycles are intertwined. Our results
suggest that experimentation supported by the
crowd can be an important channel through which
VC investors obtain access to new technologies
and trends. VC-funded startups might jump on
a bandwagon of new trends discovered on crowd-
funding platforms and commercialize these ideas
with more financial resources that make it possible
to scale faster. Where the crowd provides signals
through aggregated investments, the VC market
responds with a lag of four to eight months with
proportionally higher investments.
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Table A.1: Kickstarter category matching for CF investment categories.
Kickstarter category Merged category Kickstarter category Merged category
fashion Fashion, wellness and personal care film & video/animation Media, arts and entertainment
fashion/accessories Fashion, wellness and personal care film & video/comedy Media, arts and entertainment
fashion/apparel Fashion, wellness and personal care film & video/documentary Media, arts and entertainment
fashion/childrenswear Fashion, wellness and personal care film & video/drama Media, arts and entertainment
fashion/couture Fashion, wellness and personal care film & video/experimental Media, arts and entertainment
fashion/footwear Fashion, wellness and personal care film & video/family Media, arts and entertainment
fashion/jewelry Fashion, wellness and personal care film & video/fantasy Media, arts and entertainment
fashion/pet fashion Fashion, wellness and personal care film & video/festivals Media, arts and entertainment
fashion/ready-to-wear Fashion, wellness and personal care film & video/horror Media, arts and entertainment
crafts Hardware and consumer electronics games/playing cards Media, arts and entertainment
crafts/candles Hardware and consumer electronics games/puzzles Media, arts and entertainment
crafts/crochet Hardware and consumer electronics games/tabletop games Media, arts and entertainment
crafts/diy Hardware and consumer electronics games/video games Media, arts and entertainment
crafts/embroidery Hardware and consumer electronics journalism Media, arts and entertainment
crafts/glass Hardware and consumer electronics journalism/audio Media, arts and entertainment
crafts/knitting Hardware and consumer electronics journalism/photo Media, arts and entertainment
crafts/letterpress Hardware and consumer electronics journalism/print Media, arts and entertainment
crafts/pottery Hardware and consumer electronics journalism/video Media, arts and entertainment
crafts/printing Hardware and consumer electronics journalism/web Media, arts and entertainment
crafts/quilts Hardware and consumer electronics music Media, arts and entertainment
crafts/stationery Hardware and consumer electronics music/blues Media, arts and entertainment
crafts/taxidermy Hardware and consumer electronics music/chiptune Media, arts and entertainment
crafts/weaving Hardware and consumer electronics music/classical music Media, arts and entertainment
crafts/woodworking Hardware and consumer electronics music/country & folk Media, arts and entertainment
design Hardware and consumer electronics music/electronic music Media, arts and entertainment
design/architecture Hardware and consumer electronics music/faith Media, arts and entertainment
design/civic design Hardware and consumer electronics music/hip-hop Media, arts and entertainment
design/product design Hardware and consumer electronics music/indie rock Media, arts and entertainment
technology Hardware and consumer electronics music/jazz Media, arts and entertainment
technology/3d printing Hardware and consumer electronics music/kids Media, arts and entertainment
technology/camera equipment Hardware and consumer electronics music/latin Media, arts and entertainment
technology/diy electronics Hardware and consumer electronics music/metal Media, arts and entertainment
technology/fabrication tools Hardware and consumer electronics music/pop Media, arts and entertainment
technology/flight Hardware and consumer electronics music/punk Media, arts and entertainment
technology/gadgets Hardware and consumer electronics music/r&b Media, arts and entertainment
technology/hardware Hardware and consumer electronics music/rock Media, arts and entertainment
technology/makerspaces Hardware and consumer electronics music/world music Media, arts and entertainment
technology/robots Hardware and consumer electronics photography Media, arts and entertainment
technology/sound Hardware and consumer electronics photography/animals Media, arts and entertainment
technology/space exploration Hardware and consumer electronics photography/fine art Media, arts and entertainment
technology/wearables Hardware and consumer electronics photography/nature Media, arts and entertainment
art Media, arts and entertainment photography/people Media, arts and entertainment
art/ceramics Media, arts and entertainment photography/photobooks Media, arts and entertainment
art/conceptual art Media, arts and entertainment photography/places Media, arts and entertainment
art/digital art Media, arts and entertainment publishing Media, arts and entertainment
art/illustration Media, arts and entertainment publishing/academic Media, arts and entertainment
art/installations Media, arts and entertainment publishing/anthologies Media, arts and entertainment
art/mixed media Media, arts and entertainment publishing/art books Media, arts and entertainment
art/painting Media, arts and entertainment publishing/calendars Media, arts and entertainment
art/performance art Media, arts and entertainment publishing/children’s books Media, arts and entertainment
art/public art Media, arts and entertainment publishing/fiction Media, arts and entertainment
art/sculpture Media, arts and entertainment publishing/literary journals Media, arts and entertainment
art/textiles Media, arts and entertainment publishing/nonfiction Media, arts and entertainment
art/video art Media, arts and entertainment publishing/periodicals Media, arts and entertainment
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Table A.2: Kickstarter category matching for CF investment categories (continued).
Kickstarter category Merged category Kickstarter category Merged category
comics Media, arts and entertainment publishing/poetry Media, arts and entertainment
comics/anthologies Media, arts and entertainment publishing/radio & podcasts Media, arts and entertainment
comics/comic books Media, arts and entertainment publishing/translations Media, arts and entertainment
comics/events Media, arts and entertainment publishing/young adult Media, arts and entertainment
comics/graphic novels Media, arts and entertainment publishing/zines Media, arts and entertainment
comics/webcomics Media, arts and entertainment technology/apps Media, arts and entertainment
dance Media, arts and entertainment technology/software Media, arts and entertainment
dance/performances Media, arts and entertainment technology/web Media, arts and entertainment
dance/residencies Media, arts and entertainment theater Media, arts and entertainment
dance/spaces Media, arts and entertainment theater/experimental Media, arts and entertainment
dance/workshops Media, arts and entertainment theater/festivals Media, arts and entertainment
design/graphic design Media, arts and entertainment theater/immersive Media, arts and entertainment
design/interactive design Media, arts and entertainment theater/musical Media, arts and entertainment
design/typography Media, arts and entertainment theater/plays Media, arts and entertainment
film & video Media, arts and entertainment theater/spaces Media, arts and entertainment
film & video/action Media, arts and entertainment
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Table A.3: Crunchbase category matching for VC investment categories.
CrunchBase category Merged category CrunchBase category Merged category
Babies Fashion, wellness and personal care Creative Media, arts and entertainment
Beauty Fashion, wellness and personal care Curated Web Media, arts and entertainment
Cosmetics Fashion, wellness and personal care Design Media, arts and entertainment
Eyewear Fashion, wellness and personal care Digital Media Media, arts and entertainment
Fashion Fashion, wellness and personal care Entertainment Media, arts and entertainment
Fitness Fashion, wellness and personal care Entertainment Industry Media, arts and entertainment
Health and Wellness Fashion, wellness and personal care Events Media, arts and entertainment
Jewelry Fashion, wellness and personal care Facebook Applications Media, arts and entertainment
Kids Fashion, wellness and personal care Fantasy Sports Media, arts and entertainment
Lifestyle Fashion, wellness and personal care File Sharing Media, arts and entertainment
Lifestyle Products Fashion, wellness and personal care Film Media, arts and entertainment
Mobile Health Fashion, wellness and personal care Gambling Media, arts and entertainment
Mothers Fashion, wellness and personal care Game Media, arts and entertainment
Personal Health Fashion, wellness and personal care Game Mechanics Media, arts and entertainment
Sporting Goods Fashion, wellness and personal care Games Media, arts and entertainment
Women Fashion, wellness and personal care Gamification Media, arts and entertainment
3D Hardware and consumer electronics Maps Media, arts and entertainment
3D Printing Hardware and consumer electronics Media Media, arts and entertainment
3D Technology Hardware and consumer electronics Messaging Media, arts and entertainment
Augmented Reality Hardware and consumer electronics MicroBlogging Media, arts and entertainment
Auto Hardware and consumer electronics Mobile Games Media, arts and entertainment
Automotive Hardware and consumer electronics Mobile Video Media, arts and entertainment
Batteries Hardware and consumer electronics Mobility Media, arts and entertainment
Bicycles Hardware and consumer electronics Music Media, arts and entertainment
Bitcoin Hardware and consumer electronics Music Education Media, arts and entertainment
Cars Hardware and consumer electronics Music Services Media, arts and entertainment
Communications Hardware Hardware and consumer electronics Music Venues Media, arts and entertainment
Computers Hardware and consumer electronics Musicians Media, arts and entertainment
Consumer Electronics Hardware and consumer electronics News Media, arts and entertainment
Consumer Goods Hardware and consumer electronics Online Dating Media, arts and entertainment
Displays Hardware and consumer electronics Online Gaming Media, arts and entertainment
Drones Hardware and consumer electronics Peer-to-Peer Media, arts and entertainment
Electric Vehicles Hardware and consumer electronics Photo Sharing Media, arts and entertainment
Electronics Hardware and consumer electronics Photography Media, arts and entertainment
Energy Hardware and consumer electronics Portals Media, arts and entertainment
Hardware Hardware and consumer electronics Privacy Media, arts and entertainment
Hardware + Software Hardware and consumer electronics Publishing Media, arts and entertainment
Human Computer Interaction Hardware and consumer electronics Real Time Media, arts and entertainment
Internet of Things Hardware and consumer electronics Reviews and Recommendat. Media, arts and entertainment
Lasers Hardware and consumer electronics Semantic Web Media, arts and entertainment
Lighting Hardware and consumer electronics Social Bookmarking Media, arts and entertainment
Mac Hardware and consumer electronics Social Games Media, arts and entertainment
Mechanical Solutions Hardware and consumer electronics Social Media Media, arts and entertainment
Medical Hardware and consumer electronics Social Network Media Media, arts and entertainment
Medical Devices Hardware and consumer electronics Social Television Media, arts and entertainment
MMO Games Hardware and consumer electronics Sports Media, arts and entertainment
Mobile Devices Hardware and consumer electronics Tablets Media, arts and entertainment
New Technologies Hardware and consumer electronics Television Media, arts and entertainment
Robotics Hardware and consumer electronics Theatre Media, arts and entertainment
Sensors Hardware and consumer electronics Ticketing Media, arts and entertainment
Solar Hardware and consumer electronics Toys Media, arts and entertainment
Telephony Hardware and consumer electronics TV Production Media, arts and entertainment
Wireless Hardware and consumer electronics Twitter Applications Media, arts and entertainment
Android Media, arts and entertainment Video Media, arts and entertainment
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Table A.4: Crunchbase category matching for VC investment categories (continued).
CrunchBase category Merged category CrunchBase category Merged category
Apps Media, arts and entertainment Video Chat Media, arts and entertainment
Art Media, arts and entertainment Video Editing Media, arts and entertainment
Audio Media, arts and entertainment Video Games Media, arts and entertainment
Blogging Platforms Media, arts and entertainment Video on Demand Media, arts and entertainment
Broadcasting Media, arts and entertainment Video Streaming Media, arts and entertainment
Celebrity Media, arts and entertainment Virtual Goods Media, arts and entertainment
Chat Media, arts and entertainment Virtual Worlds Media, arts and entertainment
Communities Media, arts and entertainment Virtualization Media, arts and entertainment
Concerts Media, arts and entertainment Visualization Media, arts and entertainment
Content Media, arts and entertainment Windows Phone 7 Media, arts and entertainment
Content Creators Media, arts and entertainment Writers Media, arts and entertainment
23
